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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FEDERAL DOCTRINE OF A GENERAL COMMON LAW-

Defendant's negligent operation of his motorcycle caused injury to plaintiff,
who was riding with him as a guest. The accident occurred in Virginia, where
the state decisions permitted recovery by guests against their driver only on
proof of gross negligence. This action was brought in the Federal Court for
the District of Virginia. Held, decisions of the local courts are entitled to
respect as evidence of the law, but if they have departed from the principles
of the common law, the federal courts will follow the common law rather than
the state decisions. Hewlett v. Schadel, U. S. L. W., Jan. 23, 1934, at 10
(C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
At the time the Constitution was adopted it was thought that the federal
courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would administer
the laws of the state where the transaction took place; that the purpose in
granting such jurisdiction was to avoid the danger of discrimination by state
courts against non-citizens. 1 Yet in 184 2 , in Swift v. Tyson,2 the Supreme
Court determined that the laws of a state did not include state decisions. The
Court adopted its own interpretation of general commercial law, reaching a
result opposite to the decisions of New York's courts, where the question arose.
The same term of court found the doctrine applied to insurance law. 3 Since
then it has been extended to certain contractual relations, 4 various phases of
tort law " and to scattered instances in other fields.6 It has not, of course,
'Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1924) 37

HARv. L. REv. 49, 83. And see Field, J., dissenting in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Baugh,
149 U. S. 368, 399, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 926 (1892).
2 16 Pet. i (U. S. 1842). The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 28 U. S. C. A. § 725
(x927), authorized the federal courts to decide cases coming before them under "the laws
of the several states . . . " Justice Story, in speaking for the court, held that "laws"

referred solely to statutes, and that the decisions of the state courts were not included.

In

this connection see CoNFucr OF LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 393o) §§ 3, 4'Carpenter v. Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495 (U. S. 1842). See also Fountain & Harrington,
Inc. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 55 F. (2d) 12o (C. C. A. 4th, I932); Meigs v. London Assurance Co., 126 Fed. 781 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1904).
'Bush v. Brenner, 36 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 8th, 3929), (193o) 14 MINn. L. Rm..
684 (whether employer could contract away his liability to employees for injuries from
negligence); Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Co., 289 Fed. 405 (C. C. A. gtb, 1923)
(whether arbitration clause ousted the courts of jurisdiction) ; Snith Co. v. Minetto-Meriden Co., 168 Fed. 777 (C. C. D. Conn., i9og) (whether absolute refusal to perform contract gives other party immediate right to maintain action for his entire damages, although
contract period has not expired) ; Gilbert v. American Surety Co., 121 Fed. 499 (C. C. A.
7th, 1922) (whether bill of sale in restraint of trade might be collaterally attacked on that
ground).
'Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, supra note i, (fellow-servant doctrine); Cole v.
Penna. R. R., 43 F. (2d) 953 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) (negligence); Southern Ry. v. Smith,
214 Fed. 942 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914) ; Chicago Great Western Ry. v. Price, 97 Fed. 423 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1899) (contributory negligence); Snare & Triest v. Friedman, 169 Fed. i (C.
C. A. 3d, 39o9) (attractive nuisance).
0 See Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U. S. 518, 48 Sup. Ct. 404 (1928), in which a state rule which was very nearly a rule of
property was disregarded. More recently, in Central Vermont Ry. v. Southern New
England R. Corp., i F. Supp4 3OO4 (1932), the Federal District Court for Massachusetts
refused to follow a state decision holding that the parent corporation and its subsidiary
were separate entities, and refused to allow the parent company's assignee to prove in
receivership the subsidiary's debt to the parent. For a good summary of the earlier cases
see Note 40 L. R. A. (N. s.) 380 (1912). Compare the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Trainor v. Aetna Casualty Co., 290 U. S. 47, 78 Sup. Ct. 34 (1933), where the
Court followed the state decisions because they admittedly announced the better rule.
(647)
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touched the criminal law. 7 The doctrine, although so extended," has been
severely attacked, 9 primarily because of the uncertainty it can produce. Parties
contracting with reference to the decisional law of a state may find that
diversity of citizenship, permitting one of them to sue in the federal courts,
will lead to results other than those contemplated.10 On the other hand, it has
been urged that the federal rule is usually the better rule and tends toward
uniformity between the state and federal courts and among the states generally."1 It is doubtful whether this argument entirely justifies the doctrine.
The establishment of anything approaching uniformity can be at best only a
slow process, the more so because of the general antagonism toward the federal
doctrine. 2 Meanwhile, to have tortious conduct judged by either of two
varying standards, depending upon the irrelevant question of the amount in
suit and diversity of citizenship-as in the instant case-is anomalous. Finally,
there is not the same need for uniformity in tort law, especially in the field of
negligence, 13 that there is in commercial law. General business dealings or conduct are not disrupted by lack of uniformity in the former to the same extent
that such a lack would affect commercial law.
CONTRAcTS-RIGHT OF GRATUITOUS PROMISEE TO RECOVER FOR PROMISOR'S FAILURE TO PERFORM His PROMIsE-On destruction of the plaintiff's

house by fire, the defendant, who held a second mortgage on the property and
who was the agent of the insurance company that had issued the policy of
insurance, promised gratuitously to file proofs of loss for the plaintiff. Because
no proofs of loss were filed with the insurance company either by the plaintiff
or the defendant, the plaintiff could not recover from the insurance company
and sued defendant on his promise to file the proofs of loss. Held, that the
plaintiff could not recover, since a gratuitous promisor is not liable for nonfeasance. Comfort v. McCorkle, 268 N. Y. Supp. 192 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1933).
As the defendant's promise was without consideration, the court applied
the oft reiterated rule that the promisor is not liable if he fails to act at all,'
7United States v.
8 See Moschzisker,
L. REv.
lO9, 290, and
9
Gray presents an
LAW (2d ed. 1921)

Worrall, 2 Dall. 384 (C. C. 1798).
Common Law and Our Federal Jurisprudence (1925) 74 U. OF PA.
supra notes 4, 5 and 6.
excellent summary in his work THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF TE

251-256.

" This is the very result that the law of conflicts of laws seeks to avoid. See I BEALE,
CoNFIicr OF LAWs (1916) §3. The general rule of conflict of laws in tort cases is that
the law of the place of wrong governs the rights of the parties; CONFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 418. For an analogous problem in which the forum
refused to apply the decisional law of the place of wrong see Slaton v. Hall, 168 Ga. 71o,
148 2S. E. 741 (1929),

(1929)

43 HARV. L. REv. 135.

Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity of Citlizenship
(1929) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 179, 191. New York, the state involved in Swift v. Tyson,
has since adopted the Supreme Court's interpretation of the commercial law in the NmoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

LAw § 25.

See also Note (1930) 43 HARV. L. Rav. 926 which investigated the subsequent effect
on state decisions of the Supreme Court's rule in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Goodman,
275 U. S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24 (1927). It was unfortunate that the rule investigated was
so stringent.
"Supra note 9. See Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v. Tysoit (1930) 16 VA. L.
REv. 225; Johnson, State Law and the Federal Courts (1929) 17 Ky. L. J. 354; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts (1928)
13 CoRN. L. Q. 499; Note (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 10.5.
'It seems doubtful whether the rules of negligence law within a state ever materially
influence the conduct of the individual.
'Brawn v. Lyford, 1O3 Me. 362, 69 Atl. 544 (19o7) ; Tomko v. Sharp, 87 N. J. L. 385,
94 Atl. 793 (1915) ; Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N. Y. i8o9) ; Elsee v. Gatward, 5 T. R.
143 (Eng. 1793); STORY, BaI.mENTS (9th ed. 1878) §§ 164-172.
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but only if, after he begins performance, his conduct is negligent-either in
continuing performance in a fashion below the standard of a "reasonable man",
or in failing to carry on in a situation in which a reasonable man would continue
to act.2 The court also refused to apply to this set of facts Section 90 of the
ContractsRestatenent,' stating that that section "announces a rule of promissory
estoppel applicable only to charitable subscriptions, promises to make gifts,
etcd. 4 The restriction of Section 90 to well defined classes, in view of the
breadth of its words, would seem justified, unless the courts are ready to disregard the doctrines of common law consideration and to enforce such promises
as abstract theories of justice require.5 However, granting that there was no
common law consideration and that Section 90 does not apply, principles of
Agency and Tort, apparently not argued, seem applicable. Where the promise
is to act on behalf of the promisee, certain duties are imposed on the promisor
as an agent, regardless of consideration. One of these is that the agent must
perform, if the promised action is such that a reasonable man would expect
reliance thereon, or must notify the principal of non-performance in time that
he may take steps to protect his interests.6 Such a duty really has its basis in
tort. Generally, one must refrain from conduct likely to cause harm to
another,7 and from this it follows that one must refrain from creating a situation
which involves an unreasonable degree of risk to another because of the expectable action, or non-action, of that other." A promise may create such a
situation: a promisor may reasonably foresee that the promisee, relying on the
promise, will fail to ward off an existing risk to his interests or will act so as to
expose them to a risk created by the promisor's non-action.9 Thus, in the principal case, as the defendant was employed by the company that had issued the
insurance and had an interest in the property, he might reasonably have foreseen reliance by the plaintiff and injury to the plaintiff's interests thereby, if
he failed to perform or give reasonable notice of non-performance. Liability
- Carr v. Maine Cent. R. R., 78 N. H. 502, 1o2 Atl. 532 (1917) ; Siegel v. Spear &
Co., 234 N. Y. 479, 138 N. E. 414 (1923); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 1O3 W. Va. 574,
138 S.E. 381 (1927); cf. Kirby v. Brown Co., 229 App. Div. 155, 241 N. Y. Supp. 25_
(193o), reV'd on other grounds, 255 N. Y. 274, 174 N. E. 652 (1931).
3CoNrRAcrs RESTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 9o. "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Approved in
Saunders Co. v. Galbraith, 40 Ohio App. 155, 178 N. E. 34 (1931), (1932) 8o U. OF PA.
L. REV. 594; Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., lO5 Pa. Super. 579, 161 Atl. 571 (1932).
"Principal case at 197.
Perhaps the court might disregard the traditional concept of consideration where an
agency relationship has been created. See Kirby v. Brown Co., supra note 2.

"AGENCY RESTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932)

§ 378;

AGENCY RESTATEMENT

(Am. L.

Inst. 1932) Tentative Draft No. 7 § 599, Explanatory Notes p. 247. The Civil Law applies a similar rule: "It is open to every one to decline a commission of agency, but acceptance must be followed by execution, or by a prompt resignation, in order to enable the
principal to carry out his purpose either personally or by appointment of another agent."
FRENCH CIVIL CODE §§ 1986, 1991; SPANISH CIvIL CO)E § 1711; Note (1923) 9 CORN. L.

Q. 54.

TORTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) §§ 165, 169.
127 Me. 214, 119 Atl. 577 (1923); see Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N. Y. 17o, 181, 174 N. E. 441, 445 (1931); De La Bere v. Pearson [19o7] I
K. B. 483; TORTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) § 184.
OFor an excellent discussion of this point of view with full citation of authorities see
Note (1931) 45 HARv. L. REv. 164. Though the duty would not be owed to the whole
world, as in other tort duties, but to the promisee alone, yet the fact that a situation created by the defendant is likely to injure only one person does not make it less a tort.
'

"Cf. Jones Co. v. State,
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to the extent of the loss so caused seems a desirable result; it is regrettable
that these arguments have found so little recognition in actual litigation.10

CORPORATIONS-INSOLVENcY--RIGHT

OF PURCHASER OF SHARES FRom

CORPORATION TO RECOVER PURCHASE PRICE PAYMENTS AFTER INSOLVENCY
OF CoRPoRATIN-Claimant entered into an agreement with corporation to pur-

chase five of its shares for $500, payment to be made by crediting him with
the value of services to be rendered to the corporation. The agreement further
contained a stipulation that if the shares were not issued, the "settlement" was
to be returned in full. After claimant was credited with over $300 worth of
services, the corporation became insolvent, and claimant sought to recover from
the receiver the amount thus credited. Held, that claimant could not recover,
since he did not allege a tender of the balance of the purchase price or a refusal
by the corporation to create the shares. Quine v. Palonu Brick Co., Inc., 151
So. 253 (La. App. 1933).
If an agreement between a corporation and another which provides for
the issuance of share certificates to the other at some future time and for payment for them in installments I reveals an intention that the other party be
immediately clothed with all the rights and liabilities of an owner of the corporation,2 he becomes liable for the balance of the purchase price irrespective
of issuance of the certificates or the subsequent insolvency or bankruptcy of
the corporation. But where the intention is that by the agreement there merely
arise mutual obligations, only upon the performance of which should the incidents of shareholdership arise, the rules governing the enforcement of those
obligations should be no different than those applicable to any others which
arise out of contract. Thus a tender of a share certificate is in such case prerequisite to suit by the corporation for the balance of the purchase price; 4 and
where the corporation is bankrupt or insolvent, 5 the inability to tender a share
which is of a nature contemplated at the time of the contract (i. e., a share of
a going corporation), is a failure of consideration which prevents the enforce"0Apparently no case has directly applied these principles. It is significant, however,
that they have been sanctioned and adopted by the American Law Institute. AGENCY RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) §,378; AGENCY RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) Tentative Draft No. 7 § 599, Explanatory Notes p. 247.
' In the absence of a clear intention to the contrary, a provision that full payment for
the shares is to be made at once shows an immediate creation of shares as to the sujbscriber, since it is reasonable that the contracting party become invested with the benefits
of shareholdership after he has thus fulfilled its most substantial obligation.
'As to the elements in the agreement from which an intention to create shares either
immediately or in the future may be gleaned, see Frey, Post-IncorporationSubscriptiolr
and Other Contracts to Create Shares at a Future Time (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 750,
757; BUSINESS AssocrATIoNs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) Tentative Draft No. 2 § 42.
8 4 FLErcHE, CYCLOPEDIA COREORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 183o. Where all payments
under a contract for future creation of shares have been made and the contractor becomes
entitled to share certificates, he acquires the status of shareholder and is liable 'to the corporation regardless of its failure to issue shares because of appointment of a receiver. Villere v. New Orleans Pure Milk Co., 122 La. 717, 48 So. 162 (19o9).
'Baird v. Kilene, 53 N. D. 244, 205 N. W. 681 (1925); Security Title and Trust Co.
v. Stewart, 154 App. Div. 434, 139 N. Y. Supp. 74 (1913); Boroseptic Chemical Co. v.

Nelson, 53 S. D. 546, 221 N. W. :264 (1928).
'The mere fact that the corporation is insolvent (i. e., is unable to pay its debts, or its
liabilities exceed its assets) would not seem to afford a sufficient defense or basis of a
cause of action on the agreement, there being the possibility of extrication from such
financial difficulties. But where, as in the instant case, a receiver has been appointed and
has proceeded to sell the corporate property, the corporation may be deemed no longer
to be able to perform its contract to create shares.
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ment of the "subscriber's" obligation." Likewise, if the corporation becomes
insolvent before complete performance by the other party, the prospective
inability of the corporation to issue the requisite kind of share certificates would
seem to be an anticipatory breach 7 which should properly excuse tender of
complete performance by the other party and permit him to rescind the contract
and recover the amount of consideration already paid.8 In the principal case,
as it did not appear that the claimant was himself in default at the time of the
insolvency, such rule seems properly applicable, since the agreement was throughout considered as an executory contract of purchase rather than one for an
immediate creation of shares." The court, in refusing to permit recovery without
an allegation of tender, based its decision on a Code provision 10 requiring
tender of performance as a prerequisite to recovery on a bilateral contract; but
it is doubtful whether the necessary effect of such statute was to do away with
the doctrine of anticipatory breach in Louisiana. In the absence of this possible procedural basis, the refusal of the court to accord to the claimant the
right to recover as a creditor to which he is in all justice entitled, 1 would not
appear sustainable.
COURTS-RULE-MAKING POWER-VALIDITY OF COURT RULE CONCERNING
WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL WHICH CONFLICTS WITH STATUTE-A rule of court

provided that, in all civil cases, the parties would be deemed to have waived a
jury of twelve unless a demand for such was filed before the case appeared
on an active trial list. A statute provided that issues of fact should be tried by
jury,' - unless a jury trial should be waived by express consent, written or oral.
0 Stern v. Mayer, 166 Minn. 346, 2o7 N. W. 737 (1926); Allen v. Ryan, 125 Misc.
521, 211 N. Y. Supp. 405 (1925), rev'd, 219 App. Div. 634, 221 N. Y. Supp. 77 (1927),
on the ground that the agreement in question resulted in the immediate' creation of shares
and not merely a contract for future creation. However, the purchaser would probably
be liable to corporate creditors even though he is not a shareholder, if with his knowledge
he was held out to them as being a shareholder by the corporation, as by crediting "capital" with payments made in pursuance of the purchase agreement.
'See 2 WILISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §875, 877; 3 id. 1305, 1326; CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 287.
'The right to restitution of payments made would be based on quasi-contract principles. See WOODWARD, QUAsI-CoNTRACTS (1913) §§260 et seq.; 3 WMLISTON, op. Cit.
supra note 7, § 1337; cf. BUSINESS ASSOCATIONS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) Tentative Draft No. 2 § 51 (a) (ii). In the instant case the express stipulation in the agreement would itself give the claimant such right.
'In the process of reaching results which they consider desirable, courts often construe agreements which according to the rules of interpretation show an intention to provide for a creation of shares in the future, as resulting in the immediate creation of shares.
Thus in Pasotti v. United States Guardian Corp., I8 Del. Ch. 1, 156 At. 255 (ig3i), holders of certificates of indebtedness under an agreement for purchase of stock which clearly
appears not to have created present rights of shareholdership, were not allowed a claim as
creditors for the amount of payments made, the court calling the agreement a "subscription" for shares which were immediately created. Similarly, in Reagan v. Midland Packing Co., 298 Fed. 50o (N. D. Iowa 1924), and in Allen v. Ryan, 219 App. Div. 634, 221
N. Y. Supp. 77 (1927), under like agreements, recovery by the corporation of the unpaid
balance was permitted after the corporation's failure.
'ILA. Rav. CODE (Dart. 1932) arts. 1913, 1914.
1 The corporation could refuse claimant any of the privileges accorded shareholders,
such as participation in any dividends that might be declared, prior to the time when the
shares were agreed to be created, and so it appears only equitable that he should not bear
the risks of shareholdership in the event of the corporation's insolvency. 'The court in the instant case assumed that the term "jury" in the statute meant
of twelve". This assumption is proper, however, because it is well settled that the
"jury" as used in the state constitutions must be construed to mean "jury of twelve".
lich v. Glodich, 311 Ill. 149, 142 N. E. 466 (1924) ; State v. Berry, 19o N. C. 363, 130
12 (1925) ; Fleischman Transportation Co. v. Bishop, 12 Ohio App. 293 (1919).

"jury
word
PovS. E.
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In an action for personal injuries, the plaintiff failed to comply with the rule
of court, but did not waive a jury of twelve in the manner prescribed by the
statute. Held, that the rule of court must yield to the legislative enactment, and
that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury of twelve. Cleveland Ry. v. Halliday,
188 N. E. i (Ohio 1933).

At common law, a party can waive a jury trial in civil actions either expressly, or by failure to demand one at the beginning of the trial.2 Wherever
statutes have provided that a failure to demand a jury before the commencement of the trial should be a waiver, they have been upheld.3 Rules of court to
the same effect have likewise been upheld.4 The instant case is the first which
has raised squarely the issue which of the two, the court or the legislature, has
the ultimate power to regulate the waiver of jury trial. The court laid down as
a well-settled principle the premise that, although the legislature may enact
laws as to substantive rights, the judiciary has the ultimate power to regulate
judicial procedure. It then decided the instant case by holding that the right
to jury trial was a substantive right and so fell within the zone subject to legislative control. This premise is, however, supported by only a few dicta.5 and
a long list of legal writers.6 The cases have gone to the extent of holding that
legislative enactments providing that the courts may regulate procedure by
rules of court are not unconstitutional delegations of legislative duties, because
the power to regulate procedure is primarily a judicial power, and its exercise
by the legislatures has been possible only with the tacit consent of the courts.The legal writers also have contended that, at the very least, the legislature
might by statute re-vest the rule-making power in the courts.' But if such
statutes can be upheld only on the theory that the power delegated by them is
primarily a judicial power, then the logical conclusion would seem to be that
the statutes are unnecessary. Only Dean Wigmore, however, has dared to
assert this conclusion-that all procedural legislation is unconstitutional because
'Braun v. Miller Mfg. Co., 88 Ind. App. 631, 165 N. E. 251 (1929); Green v. Smith,
234 Ky. 448, 28 S. W. (2d) 494 (193o) ; Bratschi v. Loesch, 330 Mo. 697, 51 S. W. (2d)
69 (1932); Waterside Holding Corp. v. Lask, 233 App. Div. 456, 253 N. Y. Supp. 183
3
(1931).
Shaw v. Cheeseman, 222 Ala. 661, 133 So. 696 ('93'); Stern v. Hillman, 115 Cal.
App. 156, 300 Pac. 972 (ig3i); Goldstein v. Langenieux, 23o App. Div. 445, 245 N. Yx
Supp. 222

(1930).

'Wacker v. Grauberger, 129 Cal. App. 668,

i P. (ad) 249 (1933); Griffin v. Pere
Marquette Ry., 261 Mich. So, 245 N. W. 566 (1932).
See Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 32, 300 Pac. 575, 584 (1931) ; State v. Superior
Court, 148 Wash. I, 267 Pac. 770 (1928) (statute giving to the Supreme Court the power
to make rules of procedure held constitutional on the ground that the power delegated
was not exclusively legislative power).
6 Scott, Actions at Law In the Federal Courts (1924) 38 HAv. L. REv. i; Wigmore,
All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally (1928) 23 TLI2
L. IEv. 276; Who Shall Control Criminal Procedure? (1929) 13 J. Am. JuD. Soc. lO7;
Judicial versus Legislative Determination of Rules of Practice and Procedure-A Symposiumr (1926) 6 ORE. L. REv. 36. For a bibliography on the subject see (193o) 16 A. B.
A. J. 199.
'Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. , 278 Pac. 780 (1929) ; State v. Superior Court, supra
note 5.
In most of the United States, the procedure of the courts is now regulated by Codes
of Procedure, enacted by the legislatures within the past eighty or ninety years. Prior to
the Codes, it was regulated by the common law rules of procedure. In view of the present agitation to substitute a "rules of court" system for the "Code" system, the question
whether the rule-making power, which concededly was first in the courts, is now, too, a
judicial power, has special significance. Scott, supra note 6; Judicial versus Legislative
Determinationof Practiceand Procedure-A Symposium, supra note 6, at 38, 49.
"Scott, supra note 6, at 3; Who Shall Control Criminal Procedure?, supra note 6, at
3O9; Judicial versus Legislative Determination of Rules of Practice and Procedure, stpra
note 6, at 47.
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it constitutes an exercise of judicial power by the legislatures.9 Though the
court in the instant case was bold enough to state this conclusion, it apparently
lacked the courage to apply it consistently. Even if it be conceded that the
xight to trial by jury is a "substantial" right, it surely does not follow that a
statute which provides merely the manner by which such substantial right may
be waived is not a procedural statute. On the contrary, the fact that such
statutes are merely procedural and do not affect the substance of the right to
trial by jury is the very ground on which their constitutionality has been upheld.10 It is unfortunate that the court in the instant case failed to add judicial
authority to the already long list of non-judicial authority in support of the
rule-making power of the courts.

EQUITY-FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN COLLECTION OF
STATE TAXES WHERE STATE ALLOWS SUIT BY TAXPAYER TO RECOVER TAXES
PAID UNDER PROTEsT-In imposing a graduated retail tax on cigarettes, an
Alabama statute' provided that tax stamps be affixed to each package within
24 hours after a retailer received a shipment. In addition to imposing a penalty of $25 for each unstamped package, collectible by separate suits, the act
provided that such packages might be seized as contraband, which, pending the
outcome of forfeiture proceedings, could be regained by posting a bond for
double the value of the goods. Alabama procedure permitted a taxpayer to
sue for taxes paid under protest. Petitioner brought a bill in a federal court,
based on diversity of citizenship, to restrain the state officials from enforcing
the tax.2 Interlocutory injunction was granted. Held, that the decree be
affirmed, since the confiscations of each new shipment and the multiplicity of
suits to collect the separate penalties, coupled with the precarious financial condition of the state,3 rendered inadequate the remedy of suit against the state
for taxes paid under protest. Butler v. D. A. Schulte, Inc., 67 F. (2d) 632
(C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
Federal courts have consistently refused to enjoin state action where the
petitioner has not exhausted state administrative remedies, 4 or has failed to take
advantage of an adequate remedy at law.5 What constitutes an adequate legal
remedy is determined by federal law,6 and while "adequacy" has had a dis0
Wigmore, supra note 6.
"People v. Henderson, 246 Mich. 481, 224 N. W. 628 (1929); Goldberg Co. v. Emerman, 125 Ohio St. 238, 181 N. E. ig (I932); Public Indemnity Co. v. Pearce, 56 S. W,
(2d) 9o6 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (statute held to provide for only "regulation" within the
meaning of the Constitution).

'Ala. Laws

1932,

Ex. Sess., No. 113.

The petitioner objected to an amendment to the statute (Ala. Laws 1933, Ex. Sess.,
No. 175) which it claimed to be invalid. The amendment fixed the retail price, for taxing
purposes, as the amount at which a majority of retail dealers sold the articles. It treated
each chain organization as one dealer. Petitioner was a chain organization and, because of
the amendment, was subject to an increased tax.
The financial condition of the state admittedly was involved. Warrants issued by it
could not be paid for several years, and such warrants bore no interest.
'Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 265, 45 Sup. Ct. 8o (1924); City
Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Schnader, 54 Sup. Ct. 259 (934), (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L.
Rnv. 656; see First Nat'l Bank v. Gildart, 64 F. (2d) 873 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
'Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Salm, 258 U. S. 122, 42 Sup. Ct. 207 (1922);
Northport Power & Light Co. v. Hartley, 283 U. S. 568, 5, Sup. Ct. 58I (931) ; Matthews
v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 52 Sup. Ct. 217 (1932) ; Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U. S.
92, 53 Sup. Ct. 50 (1932).

'Munn v. Des Moines Nat'l Bank, i8 F. (2d) 269 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; Southern Ry.
v. Query, 21 F. (2d) 333 (E. D. S. C. 1927). Where cases involve undecided questions of
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tinctly functional interpretation, some well-defined distinctions have delimited
its application. Thus the courts have been less reluctant to interfere where
challenged state action is merely regulatory, and a question of constitutionality
is raised, than in instances positing the legality of a state tax where jurisdiction is sought on diversity of citizenship.7 Similarly, the courts have taken
jurisdiction to avoid a multiplicity of suits between the same parties on the same
issues,8 but have refused to interfere where the sole argument put forth is a
multiplicity of suits on the same question between different partiesY It is wellsettled that jurisdiction will not be entertained to restrain the collection of a
state tax where the state permits itself to be sued in its own courts for taxes
unlawfully collected, and full recovery may be had in a single suit.' 0 This
rule was held to be inapplicable in the principal case, however, on the ground
that the petitioner would be subject to a multiplicity of suits and seizures, as
provided by the statute, before it could obtain a judicial determination of the
validity of the tax. But this would be true only if the petitioner failed to pay
the tax. Had it complied with the statute, the petitioner could have sued the
state, and if the act were found to be invalid, the petitioner could have recovered all taxes paid under protest. Thus, the sole justification for finding the
statutory remedy inadequate rested on the fact that if the petitioner would
succeed in his suit, actual recovery would be delayed, because of the state's
financial condition, without any allowance being made for interest. 1 Where
a state is a party litigant, and the issue involves the collection of revenues, the
very life-blood of government, a court should hesitate to apply the ordinary
tests of "adequacy" of the legal remedy. In safeguarding the petitioner's remedy in the principal case, the court has not only overlooked the nationwide fiscal
impairments of government, but has forsaken the traditional policy of equity
to balance conveniences in favor of the public interest whenever it conflicts
with that of the individual.

EvIDENcE-ADmISSIBILITY OF BLOOD GROUP TEST TO ESTABLISH

NON-

PARENTAGE-In an action for carnal assault, defendant denied that he had had

intercourse with the plaintiff and that he was the father of her child. He asked
for an order subjecting plaintiff and her child to blood group tests, to compare
with his own, for the purpose of proving his non-parentage. Held, that such
state law, commentators have suggested that federal courts should exercise discretion in entertaining jurisdiction. See Lockwood, Maw, and Rosenberry, The Use of the Federal Injunction in ConstitutionalLitigatiom (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 426, 454; Isseks, Jurisdiction
of the Lower Federal Courts to Enjoin Unauthorized Action of State Officials (1927) 40
HARv. L. REv. 969, 984-88.

7See Arkansas B. & L. Ass'n v. Madden, 175 U. S. 269, 2o Sup. Ct. ii (1899) ; Hawks
v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 61, 53 Sup. Ct. 240, 242 (1933) ; United Advertising Corp. v. Lynch,
63 F. (2d) 243, 245 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933). It has been said that where there is doubt as to the
remedy at law, federal courts will take jurisdiction. Nutt v. Ellerbe, 56 F. (2d) IO58, Io63
(E. D. S. C. 1932) ; Southern Ry. v. Query, supra note 6, at 337. The illegality or unconstitutionality of a state tax is not iself a ground for equitable relief in federal courts. Boise
Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276, 29 Sup. Ct. 426 (i9o9) ; Singer Sewing Machine Co.
v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481, 33 Sup. Ct. 942 (1913).
8 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Murray, 6o F. (2d) 293 (W. D. Okla. 1932) ; see Harjim v.
Owens, 64 F. (2d) 306, 309 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; Matthews v. Rodgers, supra note 5.
' See Matthews v. Rodgers, supra note 5; Leavenworth Savings & Trust Co. v. Newman,
23 F. (2d) 835 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
" Stratton v. St. Louis & Southwestern Ry., 284 U. S. 530, 52 Sup. Ct. 222 (1932);
Matthews v. Rodgers, supra note 5; Harjim v. Owens, supra note 8; First Nat'l Bank v.
Gildart, supra note 4.
'In Nutt v. Ellerbe, supra note 7, the court held that an action against the state to recover protested taxes was inadequate since no interest was allowed.
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order should be granted, despite the objection of plaintiff, since the authoritativeness of the test is generally recognized in the scientific world. Beuschel V.
Manowitz, N. Y. Sup. Ct., Jan. i, 1934., U. S. L. W. Jan. I6, 1934, at S.
In a criminal prosecution for rape, held, that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in denying the defendant's application to subject the prosecutrix and her infant child to blood tests to establish his non-parentage, there
being nothing in the record to show that blood group tests are scientifically recognized as accurate. South Dakotav. Dunn, S. D. Sup. Ct., Dec. 29, 1933, U. S.
L. W., Jan. i6, I934, at 7
The contribution of science to the field of demonstrative evidence has
mounted rapidly in the last century. Devices for detection and identification,
such as photographs,' phonographs, 2 telephones,' and sometimes even motion
pictures, 4 have been held admissible as trustworthy evidence." The development of fingerprinting has contributed materially in effectuating justice., And
although lie-detection tests have as yet been excluded because they are not sufficiently probative 7 promise of later introduction when they become more efficient appears in the fact that intelligence tests, such as the Binet-Simon Test,"
are already admissible. A notable indication of the increasing trust courts are
reposing in scientifically established evidence is a recent Supreme Court decision that the formerly conclusive presumption that a woman is capable of bearing children must yield to definite scientific evidence to the contrary., A review
of these innovations in the law of admissibility indicates that blood tests will
probably before long be generally admitted in the courts of this country to
establish non-parentage, in spite of the apparently adverse holding of the South
Dakota court."0 Courts are always slow to entrust the jury with evidence
afforded by new scientific appliances until their probative value is generally
recognized in the profession which employs them. 1 The province of crossexamination being limited when an inanimate witness is introduced, the credibility of that witness must be much more definitely established than that of a
'See Liles v. Pickett Mills, 197 N. C. 772, 150 S. E. 363 (1929) (X-ray), Note (1932)
77 A. L. R. 946; People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N. E. 1077 (1911) (photograph of fingerprints) ; Moncur v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 269 Pa. 213, 112 Atl. 476 (1921) (photostatic copy).
'State v. Minneapolis Milk Co., 124 Minn. 34, 144 N. W. 417 (1913) (dictograph);
Boyne City v. Anderson, 146 Mich. 328, 1O9 N. W. 429 (19o6) (phonograph).
Pennsylvania Trust Co. v. Ghriest, 86 Pa. Super. 71 (1925) (telephone).
'Commonwealth v. Roller, IOO Pa. Super. 125 (1930). Contra: Gibson v. Gunn, 2o6
App. Div. 464, 2o2 N. Y. Supp. 19 (1923). See Note (933) 83 A. L. R. 1315.
*Dickerson v. Mutual Grocery Co., ioo N. J. L. 118, 124 Atl. 785 (1924) (mortality
tables to appraise damages). The present case may be compared with another recent New
York case, In re Wendel's Estate, 146 Misc. 260, 262 N. Y. Supp. 41, 5, (1934), where it
was stated that a bust prepared from pictures of the deceased by the so-called method of
dynamic symmetry was of no value to show resemblance to one claiming as his son.
'See Note (1929) 63 A. L. R. 1324; 2 WIGi0RE, EVIDENCE (1923) § 795.

Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D. C. 1923) ; Wisconsin v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 65i,
246 N. W. 314 (1933). See Notes (1925) 34 A. L. R. 147, (1933) 86 A. L. R. 616;
(1924) 24 COL. L. Rgv. 429; (924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 1138; Note (1924) 33 YALE, L. J.
771. See an interesting related problem, House, Why Truth Serumn Should Be Made Legal
(1925) 42 MED. LEGAL J. 138.
'See State v. Wade, 96 Conn. 238, 113 Atl. 458 (ig2i).
'United States v. Provident Trust Co., U. S. L. W., Feb. 6, 1934, at 476. See (933)
81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 879. Cf. Funk v. United States, 54 Sup. Ct. 212 (1933).

" The decision may be placed on the narrow ground of failure to plead and prove the

veracity of the test. Butl the court should have taken judicial notice of the ,fact that the
veracity of the test is now scientifically recognised.
n "Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognised." Frye v. United States, sapra note 8, at 1014.
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human witness, if it is to be admissible. But blood grouping tests have now
received practically universal scientific acceptance as a device to prove the
type canimpossibility of parentage in cases where the alleged father's blood
1
not be found in some combined form in the blood of the child. " The only
must
serious objection to the admissibility of the test to establish non-parentage
13
The
lie in the hesitancy of courts to compel physical examination of parties.
need for statutes empowering the court to order medical inspection wherever
it may deem it necessary is urgent.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION-WI-IEN FEDERAL COURT MAY ENJOIN THE IMOF AN ALLEGEDLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATE TAX-POINT OF
TERMINATION OF STATE'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE-A state statute- pro-

POSITION

vided for the appraisement of personal property within the state for transfer
inheritance tax purposes. It further provided for an appeal by parties dissatisfied with the appraisement to a state, court which had jurisdiction to render
a binding judgment, subject to appeal, on both the amount of the tax and the
legality of its imposition. Plaintiff, executor of the estate of a non-resident
decedent, brought a bill in a federal court to enjoin an allegedly unconstitutional2
imposition of the tax without making the statutory appeal. Held,- that where
the amount of the tax was not in dispute, 4 the appraisement terminated the
administrative procedure; and a non-resident might resort to the federal equity
court without appealing to the state court. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v.
Sclhinder, 54 Sup. Ct. 259 (1934).
The necessity for distinguishing between the legislative and judicial aspects ' of the administrative process, as provided for by the statute in the
" PEPPER AND FARLEY, PRAcTICAL HEMATOLOGIcAL DIAGNOSIS (933) 205 ff. It should
be noted that although blood tests may conclusively show that a person is not the father of
a child, they cannot go so far as to show that another person is the father.
81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 755, 761.
1 See Note (1933)
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 72, § 1202.
The bill, which was filed in the District Court, alleged that the property had never acquired a permanent situs in Pennsylvania and therefore was not subject to the Pennsylvania
tax. The agreed statement of facts indicated that the property (pictures) had been lent to
the Pennsylvania Museum for exhibition purposes for an indefinite period, subject, however, to termination at the request of the owner. It is evident that if under these facts, the
property never acquired a permanent situs in Pennsylvania, taxation by the Pennsylvania
authorities would contravene the rule of immunity from taxation by more than one state.
First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 326, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 176 (1932), and cases
'PA.

cited therein.
' The District Court for eastern Pennsylvania refused to entertain jurisdiction of the
injunction proceedings on the theory that the plaintiff had an adequate legal remedy in the
state courts. The Supreme Court pointed out that equity jurisdiction in the federal courts
is based on the inadequacy of the legal remedy in the federal courts, and not in the state
courts. It was also pointed out that the plaintiff could not avail himself of any legal remedy
in the federal court because: (i) the appeal proceedings in the state courts were purely
statutory and, therefore, were confined to the state courts; and (2) the fact that the state becomes a party to the proceedings on appeal prevents removal of the case to the federal courts.
Principal case at 261.
' Although the Court failed to treat this fact as controlling, it seems, nevertheless, to be
the sole ground for a sound distinction between the principal case and those discussed in the
text.

The facts that administrative action often combines both the legislative and judicial
functions in the same proceedings, and that courts confuse the constitutional with the procedural concepts of legislative and judicial action, both tend to make difficult a clear appreciation of the distinction. See DICKINsON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THEn SUPREMACY' OF
LAW (1927) 16.
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principal case, is founded upon two basic considerations: first, that the removal
of the state proceedings can be effected from a state court only within the
6
meaning of the federal removal statutes; second, that the federal courts will
not interfere with the state legislative process while in fieri,7 and will not
enjoin state judicial procedure at all. These two considerations were treated
by the court synonymously, the decision resting upon the ground that since the
proceedings on appeal in the state court would have been inter partes and would
have resulted in a binding judgment, the issuance of8 an injunction by the federal
court restrained not legislative, but judicial action. Although the reasons advanced seem proper, were the sole question before9 the Court whether the proceedings had been removed from a state court, substantive considerations
should prevail in determining whether the assumption of federal jurisdiction
would result in an interference with the state legislative process. Earlier decisions have established the rule that where the state court is vested with power
it exercises in a substantive sense
to revise the administrative findings de novo,
10
These cases should have furnished
a legislative, and not a judicial function.
1
ample precedent for the principal case, except for one distinguishing fact.
This, surprisingly enough, the Court failed to point out: namely, that although
the state court might exercise legislative functions in some instances, it could
on appeal
not possibly have done so here, since the only question involved
2
would have been the validity of the tax-a pure question of law.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-AMENDMENT OF CODE PLEADINGS AS INTRODUCING A NEW "CAUSE OF AcTION"-In suing on a promissory note, the plaintiff alleged that it was given to secure loans to the two defendants as co-partners, and was executed by one of them as his note with the authority of the
other.' In pleading over after a judgment in his favor was reversed and the
statutory period of limitations had run, the plaintiff amended the complaint
036 STAT.

lO94

(I91n),

as amended by 38

STAT.

278 (1914), 28 U. S. C. A. §71 (1927).

For the apv. Abbey,
Plested
see
action,
executive
involving
to
situations
plication of the same principle
228 U. S. 42, 51, 33 Sup. Ct. 503, 504 (1913) ; Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U. S, 162, 172, 33
Sup. Ct. 639, 641 (1913).
I Principal case at 261.
M iss. & R. River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 (1878) ; Delaware County v.
Diebold Safe Co., 133 U. S. 473, 10 Sup. Ct. 399 (89o) ; Smith v. Douglas County, 254 Fed.
244 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
"0This concept was only indirectly touched upon in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,
supra note 7, but was strongly relied uport in Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U. S. 428, 43
Sup. Ct. 445 (923), and in Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 52 Sup. Ct. 617
(1932). But compare the distinction drawn between legislative and judicial functions in
DICKINSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 21, and in Green, Separation of Governmental Powers
(1920) 29 YAIE L. J. 369, 377.
1' Since the statute here empowered the state court to determine all questions of valuation, it would seem that that court is vested with a complete revisory power, a situation on
all fours with that in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., supra note 7, and Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, supra note 10.
" This point, although strenuously contended for by the plaintiff in the principal case,
seems not to have impressed the Court, .for it is nowhere discussed in the" opinion. Dicton,
however, in Smith v. Douglas County, supra note 9, at 246, seems to sustain the soundness of
the plaintiff's contention.
* Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 2IO, 29 Sup. Ct. 67 (19o8).

'The allegation that one partner signed with the authority of the other and the form of
the action clearly expresses to the defendant the plaintiff's intention not to sue only the
maker of the note on "his" note.
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to allege the execution of the note in the name of the partnership. Held, that
irrespective of the meaning of "cause of action", the change of a single fact
did not violate the policy against stale claims expressed in the statutes of limitation. 2 Harris v. Singh, 28 P. (2d) i (N. M. 1934).
The abolition by the codes of the common law forms of action, and their
reliance for a judicial unit on their undefined term "cause of action", 3 has led
to much confusion and to many vain attempts to set up a concept applicable
to all situations.4 Thus, one view identifies the "cause of action" with the violation of a "primary" right,5 another with that group of operative facts that
show a single right in terms of common law remedies, 6 while a third, by analogy
to equity pleading traditionally, defines it as all the operative facts, leaving it
to the court to determine whether such facts disclose a violation of legal
rights.7 But essentially, the problem is one of approach. The classical method
where the statute of limitations is involved is to begin with the rule that, after
the statutory period, an amendment stating a new "cause of action" is barred. s
The danger here is that in defining "cause of action" as a concept, cases will
be relied on that do not involve the statute of limitations. There is little persuasive force in demonstrating that in states where an amendment may never
present a new "cause of action"," amendments similar to that in the instant
'The opinion greatly relies on N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 19:2) §83-1Io, which
permits a plaintiff to begin a "new suit" within six months of the "failure" of the first for
any cause but his negligence. In the opinion on motion for rehearing (instant case at 4) the
statute was declared determinative on two theories: either its terms compelled a general "liberal" view of amendments, assuming it necessary (as the court did not) to define the "cause
of action", or the terms included not only a new suit but the repleading of an old one. As
to the first, it is submitted that it is not a question of "liberality" of amendments; the issue
is whether the policy of the statute of limitations has been violated. See infra notes 1I, 12.
The second theory absolutely prevents the application of the policy behind the limitation of
actions to any amendments that the very broad code provisions permit-in some states, even
new "causes of action". McDonald v. Jackson, 55 Iowa 37, 7 N. W. 408 (188o) ; McWhirt
v. McKee, 6 Kan. 412 (1870).
3 CLARK, CODE PLEADING (928) 44 ff.; McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Actions (I925)
34 YALE L. J. 614, 635, criticized in Clark, AncienA Writs and Modern Causes of Action
(0925) 34 YALE L. J.879. For discussion of judicial antagonism to the codes see POmFRoY,
CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §§ 4-9.
As to the different uses of the term and the various problems involved, see Gavit, Code
Cause of Action: Joinder and Counterclaims (193o) 30 COL. L. REV. '8o2; CLARK, CODE
PLEADING (1928) 75, n. IiO.
' PomERoy, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 346-349, criticised in McCaskill, sufpra note 3, at 634;
CLARK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 81; cf. Gavit, supra note 4, at 803, 804.
'McCaskill, supra note 3, in which it is argued that the abolition of the form of action
need not abolish its common law theory; criticised in POMEROY, op. cit. -supra note 3, § 347;
CLARK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 79, 8o.
" CLARK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 83 ff.; here the limiting factor is merely trial convenience, which is broad enough to be no "concept" at all. See' Clark, The Cause of Action
(934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 354, 360, and discussion infra note 12. The view is criticised in
McCaskill, supra note 3, at 62o, and in Gavit, supra note 4, at 816. Cf. Read v. Brown, 22
Q. B. Div. 228, 131 (2888).
8 Note (19o6) 3 L. R. A. (N. s.) 259, 269, 27o. This is the rule, apparently, that Gavit,
supra note 4, at 829, would ignore, but which Clark, suprd note 7, at 357, insists upon keeping, although he probably avoids the effect of it by his "fact" definition of "cause of action".
I Anthony v. Slaydon, 27 Colo. 144, 6o Pac. 826 (igoo) ; Thompson v. Beeler, 69 Kan.
462, 77 Pac. IOO (I9O4) ; Silver v. Jorden, 139 Mass. 280, 1 N. E. 280 (2885). The general
code provisions for amendments are discussed in PomEsoy, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 329, 457;
CLARK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 174, 5oi. A wide difference of opinion is prevalent, some
courts permitting entirely new "causes of action" to be introduced. Robinson v. Willoughby,
67 N. C. 84 (1872); Deyo v. Morss, 244 N. Y. 216, 39 N. E. 81 (1894).
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case were allowed 10 if in these cases the policy behind limitation of actions
was not considered. The more modem cases have repudiated this approach,
have refused to set up a general definition of "cause of action", and have only
considered whether there has been such a substantial change of the operative
facts as to place the defendant at a disadvantage because of the staleness of the
new allegations; 11 clearly, this policy, as expressed in statutes of limitations,
does not apply to the defendant, if from the beginning he has been well aware
of the nature of the claim against him and the intentions of the plaintiff.1 2 The
instant case, in which the original complaint informed defendants of the plaintiff's intention to hold both liable on the note, is a commendable illustration of
the application of this rule.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-BANKS AND BANKING-DISCHARGE OF SURETY
ON STATE DEPOSITARY BOND BY OPERATION OF BANK CONSERVATION AcT-In

compliance with a provision of a Pennsylvania statute,' defendant delivered its
bond to the Commonwealth to enable bank to qualify as a depositary of state
funds. Subsequently, a conservator was appointed under the provisions of the
Bank Conservation Acl,2 and payment of the state's draft for the amount of
the deposit refused. Under the terms of the bond, judgment was confessed
in favor of the Commonwealth, and from a refusal to open the judgment, the
surety company appealed. Held, that the passage of the Bank Conservation,
Act, and the executive orders thereunder,8 was not such a supervening impossibility as to release the surety from immediate liability to the state. Colnlionwealth v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Supreme Court of Penn"The following cases did not involve the statute of limitations, although the amendments were allowed: Haviland v. Mayfield, 38 Colo. 185, 88 Pac. 148 (i9o6) (partners as
defendants changed to individuals) ; Kennedy Butter Co. v. First National Bank, 115 Kan.
63, 222 Pac. 754 (1924) (defendant as corporation changed to individual) ; Barker v. Burgess, 44 Mass. 273 (1841) (suit on promissory note against individual changed to include
partnership) ; cf. Loreck & Laurence v. Heslep, 112 S. C. 375, 99 S. E. 835 (1919). For
cases involving the statute of limitations and allowing the amendments see: Chambers v.
Real Estate Ass'n, 126 Ala. 296, 28 So. 636 (i9oo) ; Harrison v. McCormick, 122 Cal. 651,
55 Pac. 592 (I898). Contra: Wigton v. Smith, 57 Neb. 299, 77 N. W. 772 (I899).
'Missouri K. & T. R. R. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct. 135 (1913) (suit under
state statute changed to one under Federal Employers' Liability Act) ; Seaboard Air Line
Ry. v. Koennecke, 239 U. S. 352, 36 Sup. Ct. 126 (9,5); Kinney v. New York C. R. R.,
26o U. S. 34o, 43 Sup. Ct. 122 (1922); cf. Baltimore S. S. Co v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316,
47 Sup. Ct. 60o (1927).
It has
' United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 53 Sup. Ct. 278 (933).
been recently argued that this case rests upon Clark's definition of "cause of action". Arnold,
The Code "Cause of Action ' (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 215. But this conclusion is vigorously
opposed in Gavit, A "Pragmatic Definitio" of the "Cause of Action.' (933) 82 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 129 (answered in Clark, supra note 7). The essence of the controversy seems to be
that Gavit, following the courts, refuses to apply even his own concept of "cause of action"
where the statute of limitations is involved, while Clark so defines his "cause of action" that
its requirements are identical with those of the statute of limitations, i. e. substantial fact
identity. Cf. Gavit, supra note 4, at 818, implying that the defendant is bound to anticipate
all the possible amendments the generous code provisions might allow.

'Act approved June 7, 1923, P. L. 498, § 11o2, as amended April 13, 1927, P. L. 2o7, § 45,
amending § 1102, in force when the bond was given and recited in the proceedings.
*48 STAT. 2 §20, (933),
12 U. S. C. A. Supp. §2oi et seq. (,933).
* PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAmATIONS Nos. 2039, 2040, 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. § 95 n. (933);
ExEc. ORDER No. 6073, 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. § 95 n. (1933) ; ExEc. ORDER No. 6080, 12 U. S.
C. A. SuPP. § 2o3 n. (933).
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sylvania, January 30, 1934. Contrla:4 City of East Cleveland v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. of Maryland, 5 F. Supp. 212 (N. D. Ohio 1933).
The theory of the federal decision was that the bank had been prevented
by law from meeting its obligation to the city, and since the depositor's demand
gave rise to no cause of action at that time, there was no immediate right of
action against the surety. It is generally recognized that where facts that a
promisor had no reason to anticipate, and for the occurrence of which he is not
in contributing fault, render performance of the promise impossible, the duty
of the promisor is discharged unless a contrary intention has been manifested.5
But if the impossibility is subjective rather than objective, that is, due to the
inability of the individual promisor rather than to the nature of the performance, the duty of the promisor is not discharged.6 Thus, insolvency of the
promisor cannot excuse his non-performance. 7 It is also definitely established
that where performance is prevented by operation of law, the duty of the promisor is either discharged s or suspended pending the removal of the legal restriction. 9 In the present cases the sureties would not have been liable for
the failure of the banks to meet demands during the banking holiday; but the
demands were made when the banks were again operating, though on a restricted basis. The possibility of inability on the part of the banks to meet
their obligations because of legal restrictions was doubtless within the contemplation of the parties at the time the bond was written. True, they hardly
could have anticipated the Bank Conservation Act specifically, but both sureties admitted liability in the event that the banks had been thrown into the
hands of receivers. The very purpose of the statutory bond is to insure to
the governmental depositor the immediate and certain use of its funds whenever it may call for them, and liability was not intended to depend upon the
depositor's right to sue the bank. The conservators are, by the wording of the
Act, 10 practically receivers, although in both cases they were permitted to pay
out old deposits on a percentage basis. Also, the inability of the banks to perform was due, in all probability, to their own fault," and such a contingency
"The two cases involve almost identical factual situations. The depositor in the Pennsylvania case was the state, while in the federal case it was a city, and the conservator for
the Ohio bank was appointed in accordance with concurrent state legislation. OHio GEN.
CODE (Throckmorton, 193o) § 4295; (Baldwin, Supp. 1933) §§ 71o-88a, 71O-lO7a. However, the difference of judicial opinion cannot be attributed to these variations.
'The Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U. S. 12, 37 Sup. Ct. 490 (1917) ; The Claveresk, 264
Fed. 276 (C. C. A. 2d, 192o); St. Joseph Hay Co. v. Brewster, 195 S. W, 711 (Mo. App.
1917) ; Ward v. Vance, 93 Pa. 499 (188o) ; Bailly v. DeCrespigny, L. R. 4 Q. B. I8o (1869);
CONTRAcTs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 457.
'Cluley-Miller Coal Co. v. Freund Packing Co., 138 Mo. App. 274, 120 S. W. 658
(19o9) ; Eppens v. Littlejohn, 164 N. Y. 187, 58 N. E. 19 (1900) ; CONTRACTs RESTATEMENT
(Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 455.
1Lewis v. Atlas Mutual Ins. Co., 6I Mo. 534 (1876) ; 3 Wr.IsTON, CONTRACTS (1922)

§

1932.
1 Wischhusen

v. American Medicinal Spirits Co., Inc., 163 Md. 565, 163 Atl. 685 (1933);
CoNTRAcrs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 458.
1 United States Trading Corp. v. Newmark Grain Co., 56 Cal. App. 176, 205 Pac. 29
(1922) ; CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 462.
1048 STAT. 2 §203 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. SupP. §203 (1933).
Such conservator
shall have all the rights, powers, and privileges now possessed by or hereafter given receivers
of insolvent national banks and shall be subject to the obligations and penalties, not inconsistent with the provisions of this title, to which receivers are now or may hereafter become
subject. During the time that such conservator remains in possession of such bank, the
rights of all parties in respect thereto shall . . . be the same as if a receiver had been appointed therefor."

'Although it is conceivable that a bank might be prohibited from paying, though in fit
condition to do business at the time, the burden of proving that the restriction had been

wrongfully imposed upon that particular depositary should logically be upon the surety.
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must have been contemplated by the parties to the bond. Liability on the part
of the sureties therefore follows, and there seems, little doubt1 2 that the Pennsylvania decision is the sounder and more desirable of the two.

TORTS-IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MANUFACTURER OF FOOD WHICH CONTAINS HARMFUL SUBSTANCE-INAPPLICABILITY OF RES IPSA LoQUITUR-De-

fendant, manufacturer and bottler, supplied Coca-Cola to news-stand frohi
which plaintiff purchased a bottle and drank part of its contents. The bottle
contained the body of a decomposed mouse, and plaintiff became violently ill.
In the face of evidence that there was no opportunity for tampering with the
bottles while in the dealer's possession, the defendant introduced evidence of
its modern system of cleansing bottles, and of an experiment of sending a
bottle containing a mouse through this system, which completely removed all
traces of the animal matter. Jury returned verdict for the plaintiff. Held, that
liability cannot be based upon an implied warranty, but only upon negligence,
which was not proved; and that res ipsa loquitur does not apply, since that
which caused the injury was not under the control and management of the
defendant at the time of the casualty. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Rowland, 66
S. W. (2d) 272 (Tenn. 1933).

The court in the instant case would have had ample authority:' and reason
to reach a contrary result in view of the fact that considerations of public
policy and interest in health far outweigh any possible burden upon business
which may result from holding manufacturers of food absolutely liable for its
wholesomeness. 2 But the holding of this court threw upon the plaintiff the
practically insurmountable difficulty of proving negligence when all the facts

regarding the preparation of the food were peculiarly within the defendant's
knowledge.3 Nor could plaintiff properly invoke the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, even though its rejection was tantamount to the court's expression of
opinion that some one other than defendant was in control of the bottle when
the dangerous condition was created,4 since to admit the doctrine would be to
' However, it must be borne in mind that the surety's right of subrogation may not extend to the state's right of priority in deposits when the bank is liquidated or final payment
made. South Philadelphia State Bank's Insolvency, 295 Pa. 433, 145 Atl. 520 (1929) ; Note
(1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. Rlv. 441.
'Parks v. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914) ; Meshbesher v. Channellene
Oil and Mfg. Co., lO7 Minn. lO4, 119 N. W. 428 (19o9) ; Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27
Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (1928) ; Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability
(1919) 5 IOWA L. Bu.. 6, 86; Note (1932) 9 N. Y. U. L. REv. 360; (1933) 81 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 483; (1928) 26 MicH. L. REv. 461.
a (1920) 18 Mic. L. REv. 316, 436; Note (1932) IS CoRN. L. Q. 128. Moreover, the
manufacturer is in the best position to distribute such added costs.
3 This fact alone has evoked the opinion that the manufacturer's duty should be absolute.
Note (1919) 4 CORN. L. Q. 74, 77; Note (927) 12 CoRN. L. Q. 544, 546; (1933) 81 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 483. It is also the fundamental reason underlying res ipsa loquitur. Harper
and Heckel, Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22 ILT. L. REv. 724. But
the difficulty of proof of negligence should never be the sole reason for holding an absolute
liability.
,Ash v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 86, 12o N. E. 396 (1918) (tack in berry pie),
criticized in (1918) 32 HARv. L. REv. 71, 73, and in 5 WIG oRE,,EVIDEiCE (2d ed. 1923)
§ 25o9 n. 2. Compare Jacob v. Childs Co., 166 N. Y. Supp. 798 (1916) (nail in cake-res
ipsa loquitur not applicable) with Freeman v. Schultz Bread Co., I00 Misc. 528, 163 N. Y.
Supp. 396 (1916) (nail in bread held to make "prima facie" case for jury).
In view of the care exercised by the news-stand dealer, the same defense of inapplicability of res ipsa loquztu should likewise absolve him from liability, leaving plaintiff with
no recovery.
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make the opposite assumption that the act of negligence charged to defendant,
i. e., permitting the bottle to leave its plant with a mouse enclosed, took place
when the bottle was in its control.5 Nevertheless, even though rejecting res
ipsa loquitur, some courts have reached the desirable result of submitting the
question of negligence to the jury; 1 others have done the same, contrary to
evidence
the principal case, even though the defendant offered uncontroverted
7
of the modern methods employed in the preparation of the food. Still other
courts base the manufacturer's liability upon an implied warranty, which imposes in effect an absolute liability.8 To satisfy those courts rejecting this
9
theory on the ground that no privity of contract exists, it has been suggested
devices: the third party
following
the
to
that privity may be "found" by resort
beneficiary doctrine, 10 or an offer of an unilateral contract by the manufacturer, which is accepted by the act of purchasing from the dealer.", Moreover,
privity of contract may be dispensed with entirely in situations like the instant
case, if the essentially tortious nature of warranty were recognized, instead of
being overlooked by the too-ready assumption that it is strictly a contract
action.' 2 Carefully analyzed, the liability for breach of warranty is not imposed
because of an obligation, voluntarily assumed in return for a consideration
received from another; it results from the misrepresentation, upon which the
buyer relies to his damage, that the manufacturer's product is fit for consumption."3
I Most cases where res ipsa loquitur is applied actually occur where defendant was admittedly in sole control of the agency the alleged negligent handling of which causes the injury, as in collisions or train wrecks. But here, the act of negligence charged caused the
injury when the bottle no longer was in defendant's control. Nevertheless, the doctrine has
been held applicable on the ground that the defendant had control at the time the alleged
negligent act took place. Rost v. Kee & Chappell Dairy Co., 216 Ill. App. 497 (192o) ; G. &
F. Bott. Co. v. Sindell, 74o Md. 488, 117 Atl. 866 (1922) (both cases involved glass in bottles). See Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 797, 176 N. W. 382, 397 (192o).

IDrury v. Armour & Co., 74o Ark. 371, 216 S. W. 40 (1919); Ward Baking Co. v.
Trizzino, supra note I; Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 5o R. I. 43, L44 Atl. 884
(1929).

Coca-Cola Bott. Co. v. Barksdale, i7 'Ala. App. 6o6, 88 So. 36 (92o)

; Bradfield v.

Atlanta Coca-Cola Bott. Co., 24 Ga. App. 657, 701 S.E. 776 (1920) ; Davis v. Van Camp
Packing Co., supra note 5; Jackson Coca-Cola Bott. Co. v. Chapman, io6 Miss. 864, 64 So.
791 (914) ; Rozumailski v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bott. Wks., 296 Pa. 114, 145 At. 700 (929).
Liability would be based by the court in the instant case upon the violation of only a
strict duty of care, the standard of which, evidently, is the modern method of preparation.
Yet, if it were proved that the foreign substance in fact got in the food at the defendant's
plant, certainly there would be liability imposed. Roddy Mfg. Co. v. Cox, 7 Tenn. App. 747
(927); Coca-Cola Bott. Wks. v. Lewis, 9'Tenn. App. 485 (1928). The conclusion necessarily follows that the manufacturer's duty is therefore an absolute one. See Perkins, supra
note I, at 93.

1 Ala. Coca-Cola Bott. Co. v. Ezzell, 22 Ala. App. 210, 114 So. 278 (927); Nock v.
Coca-Cola Bott. Wks. of Pittsburgh, ioz Pa. Super. 575, 156 Atl. 537 (ig3i) ; Mazetti v.
Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (913); WAITE, SALES (1921) 199 n. 105; see
Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 335, 357. Contra:
Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 S. W. 288 (79o5) ; Flaccomio v. Eysink,
129 Md. 367, ioo At. 510 (1916); Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N. Y. 468, 729 N. E. 576

(1923) ; Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bott. Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S.W. 155 (915).
9It has been held that no privity of' contract is necessary for plaintiff to recover. Ket-

terer v. Armour & Co., 2oo Fed. 322 (D. C. N. Y. 1912) ; Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co.,
324 Ga. I21, 52 'S.E. 152 (1905); Catani v. Swift & Co., 25, Pa. 52, 95 Atl. 931 (0915)

(statute).
"3Note (924) 9 CORN. L. Q. 487.
n Note (1929) 42 HARV. L. REv. 414; 3 WILSTON, COTRAcrs §§ 1505, 15o6; cf. Carlill
v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] I Q. B. 256.

" Note (1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 414; see Williston, The Progress of the Law, 9ig934 HARv.L. R~v. 741, 762.
Sales (92)
'This recognizes the realities of the modem method of doing business, especially when
so many foods are sold under trade names.
1920:
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TORTS-LIBEL AND SLANDER-PUBLICATION

IN LABOR ORGANIZATION

NEWSPAPER AS QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE-Plaintiff, a driver for the only union
laundry in Denver, left it and entered the employ of a hostile "open" laundry.
Defendant, editor of the official newspaper of the state federation of labor,:
investigated and was erroneously informed that plaintiff continued soliciting
laundry without disclosing his change of employment. 2 Defendant published
an article of warning, describing plaintiff and two others similarly situated as
"most despicable"; "spies"; "traitors"; that they had "sold their Manhood,
if they ever possessed any"; and that they were taking laundry to the nonunion
shop without their customers' knowledge. Held, that the publication was qualifiedly privileged, and that the strong words presented no evidence of "actual"
malice for the jury. Bereman v.Power Pub. Co., 27 P. (2d) 749 (Colo. 1933).
The bona fide communication of a false and defamatory statement is qualifiedly privileged if the communicant and recipient each possess duties or interests in the communication of the subject matter.1 Such interests exist in
communications between a church and its members; 4 a school board and patrons of the school; 5 a fraternal society and the individual brothers; 6 and between an employer and his employees.7 The determining factor in these cases
is that the information, if true, would be of direct concern to both parties in
their business or social affairs: the advantages of publication in maintaining
loyalty and cooperation outweigh the occasional personal damage thereby
caused. While the instant case appears to be the first one involving defamatory communications between a labor union and its members, there exists a
sufficient mutual interest in the preservation of loyalty to accord qualified privilege to communications respecting disloyalty. However, while the use of vituperative language does not per se destroy a privilege, it is usually held to furnish evidence of the existence of "actual" malice, i. e., that defendant lacked a
bona fide belief in the truth of the statements; ' that the statements are irrelevant to the matter in issue; 10 or that the defamation transcends the duty or occa1The circulation of this newspaper was confined almost exclusively to members of labor
unions. Incidental publication to a third party will not defeat a privileged' communication.
Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (19o8).
' However, it does not appear that plaintiff disclosed the fact that the present laundry
was nonunion. Further, he continued to wear his union pin. Most of the customers of the
union laundry were themselves members of some labor union.
3
HARPER, TORTS (1933) §249; NEwEU., SLANDER AND LBrEL (4th ed. 1924) §341;
ODGERs, LmBEL AND SLANDER (6th ed. 1929) 231.
'Redgate v. Rousch, 6I Kan. 480, 59 Pac. lO5O (i9oo) ; Howard v. Dickie, 120 Mich.
238, 79 N. W. 191 (1899) ; Shurtleff v. Stevens, 5I Vt. 5o (1879) ; Note (1929) 63 A. L.
R. 649.
'Hoover v. Jordan, 27 Colo. App. 515, 150 Pac. 333 (1915) ; Weiman v. Mabee, 45 Mich.
484, 8 N. W. 71 (1881) ; Decker v. Gaylord, 35 Hun 584 (N. Y. 1885).
"Burton v. Dickson, O4 Kan. 594, i8o Pac. 216 (1919) ; Bayliss v. Grand Lodge, 131
La. 579, 59 So. 996 (1912) ; Holmes v. Royal Fraternal Union, 222 Mo. 556, 121 S. W. 100
The cases are collected in Note (1919) 3 A. L. R. 1654.
(19o9).
7
A B v. X Y, [1917] Sess. Cas. 15 (S.C. 1916).
' Such malice must not be confused with the "malice" which many courts require, but
"presume", in cases involving non-privileged defamatory communications. The use of such
fiction is unfortunate: it means siniply that proof of motive or intent is not a condition precedent to liability in such cases. See NmwELL, op. Cit. supra note 3, § 271 et seq.
IJump v. Barnes, 139 Md. IOI, 114 Atl. 734 (I921) ; Chaffin v. Lynch, 84 Va. 884, 6 S.
E. 474 (1888) ; see Jones, Interest and Duty in Relation to Qualified Privilege (1924) 22
MIcE. L. REV. 437, 450.
20Kozel v. Kozel, 1O4 Kan. 530, i8o Pac. 278 (1919) ; Smith v. Smith, 73 Mich. 445, 41
N. W. 499 (889).
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sion for which the privilege is granted.-" And, while it is within the province
of the trial judge to determine whether there is any evidence of malice to go to
the jury, 2 his judgment is subject to review.'3 The instant case manifests an extreme view in that the question of malice was not submitted to the jury. 4 While
strong language may conceivably be necessary to effect the purpose of a labor
union publication, it is questionable whether the policy of protecting the interests of the union members or sympathizers is sufficient to require that union
membership carry with it such abject surrender of the right to freedom from
disparagement of reputation.

UNFAIR COMPETITION-DEFINITION OF "UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETI-

was one
of a number of penny candy manufacturers packing "break and take" candies.
A typical method of packing was to pack candies with centers of varying colors
and to refund the price to buyers choosing candies of a certain color. The
candy was intended for the school child trade. The Federal Trade Commission
ordered defendant to cease and desist from the practice, classifying it as an
unfair method of competition. Held, that the order of the commission be sustained. Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 54 Sup. Ct. 423
(1934), rev'g 63 F. (2d) 81 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1933).
The Federal Trade Commission has been given jurisdiction to order business operators to desist from unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce ' when such methods are injurious to the interest of the public.2 The
Supreme Court early decided that the definition of the term "unfair methods
of competition" was for the courts.' In defining it, courts have not been particularly liberal in adding to the common law definition, which included merely
cases involving "passing off" goods for those of another, and certain combinations in restraint of trade.4 The principal extension has been the inclusion of
all types of misbranding and false advertising.' The dogma has been that the
commission is not a censor of business morals,6 but that the practice must be
TION" WITHIN THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AcT-Defendant

' National Cash Reg. Co. v. Salling, 173 Fed. 22 (C. C. A. 9th, 19o9) ; Smith Bros. v.
Agee & Co., 178 Ala. 627, 59 So. 647 (1912) ; Stanley v. Prince, 118 Me. 36o, io8 Atl. 328
(1919) ; Pate v. Trollinger, 113 Miss. 255, 74 So. 131 (1917) ; Taber v. Aransas, etc. Ry.,
219 S. W. 860 (Tex. Civ. App. 192o); HARPER, ToRTs (1933) §252; Jones, supra note 9;
NEWELL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 392; ODGms, op. cit. supra note 3, at 281 et seq.
'For an excellent survey of the decisions see Note (1923) 26 A. L. R. 830, 852. Mani-

festly, language used in a privileged occasion should not be submitted to a strict scrutiny, and
liability should not be imposed for trifling excesses. See NEWELL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 345;
ODGERS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 291 et seq.
" Appellate courts have held that evidence of malice exists in much more temperate words
than those presented by the instant case. See authorities cited supra notes 9, IO, ii.
" Cf. A B v X Y, supra note 7, adversely criticized in Lorimer, Does a Privileged Occasion J stify a Reckless Slander? (1917) 29 JuR. REv. 341.
'FEDERAL TRADE CommxlssioN ACT, 38 STAT. 717, 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (1927).

'The jurisdictional facts are: (i) The methods complained of must be unfair. (2)
The methods must be of competition in interstate commerce. (3) A proceeding by the
commission to prevent the use of the methods must be in the interest of the public. Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643, 646, 51 Sup. Ct. 587, 589 (93).
' Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 Sup. Ct. 572 (1920).

'See

HARPER, TORTS (933)
§234.
'See Federal Trade Commission v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U. S. 212, 53 Sup. Ct. 335
(0933), rev'g 58 F. (2d) 581 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); Algoma Lumber Co. v. Federal Trade

Commission, 54 Sup. Ct. 315 (1933), rev'g 64 F. (2d) 618 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933).
See Northam Warren Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 59 F. (2d) 196 (C. C. A.
2d, 1932); HENDERSON,

THE FEDERAL TRADE CommISSIol

(1924)

166.
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characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or must be against
public policy because of its dangerous tendency to hinder competition unduly
or to create monopoly.7 In the principal case it is evident that the Court was
moved by the thought that the gambling aspect of the method of competition
involved is contrary to public policy in a broader sense. This is reflected by
the statement of Mr. Justice Stone that any method of competition "which
casts upon one's competitors the burden of loss of business unless they will
descend to a practice which they are under a powerful moral compulsion not to
adopt, even though not criminal", is unfair." This statement does in effect
establish the commission as a censor of business morals and provides a lever
for eradicating any practice which "public policy" may from time to time find
objectionable. It is an important step forward in the federal regulation of
business and suggests a basis upon which the Court may rely in support of
some of the code aspects of the National IndustrialRecovery Act.
7The monopoly and combination
restraint of trade aspect was reinforced by the
provisions of the Sherman Act, 26 STAT.in 209
(1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-7, 15 (1927), and
15 U. S. C. A. §§ 12-27 (1927).
730 (914),
the Clayton Act, 38 STAT.
8 Principal case at 426.

